Control of entropy in neural models of environmental state by Muller, T.H. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/201418
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2019-06-02 and may be subject to
change.
*For correspondence:
timothymuller127@gmail.com
(THM);
jill.oreilly@psy.ox.ac.uk (JXO’R)
Competing interest: See
page 20
Funding: See page 20
Received: 20 June 2018
Accepted: 06 February 2019
Published: 28 February 2019
Reviewing editor: Tobias H
Donner, University Medical
Center Hamburg-Eppendorf,
Germany
Copyright Muller et al. This
article is distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use and
redistribution provided that the
original author and source are
credited.
Control of entropy in neural models of
environmental state
Timothy H Muller1*, Rogier B Mars1,2, Timothy E Behrens1,3, Jill X O’Reilly1,2,4*
1Wellcome Centre for Integrative Neuroimaging, Centre for Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging of the Brain, University of Oxford, John Radcliffe Hospital,
Oxford, United Kingdom; 2Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour,
Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; 3Wellcome Centre for Human
Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United
Kingdom; 4Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford,
United Kingdom
Abstract Humans and animals construct internal models of their environment in order to select
appropriate courses of action. The representation of uncertainty about the current state of the
environment is a key feature of these models that controls the rate of learning as well as directly
affecting choice behaviour. To maintain flexibility, given that uncertainty naturally decreases over
time, most theoretical inference models include a dedicated mechanism to drive up model
uncertainty. Here we probe the long-standing hypothesis that noradrenaline is involved in
determining the uncertainty, or entropy, and thus flexibility, of neural models. Pupil diameter,
which indexes neuromodulatory state including noradrenaline release, predicted increases (but not
decreases) in entropy in a neural state model encoded in human medial orbitofrontal cortex, as
measured using multivariate functional MRI. Activity in anterior cingulate cortex predicted pupil
diameter. These results provide evidence for top-down, neuromodulatory control of entropy in
neural state models.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.001
Introduction
Faced with a constant stream of complex sensory data, observers construct internal (mental) models
of the underlying state of the world that generated that data. These models allow the observer to
understand and make predictions about the environment. The current state of the environment can
be thought of as a latent variable in such models, that is a variable that cannot be observed directly
but must be inferred from sensory observations. For example a rat in a reversal learning task needs
to know the underlying state of the world (which of two levers is more likely to deliver a food
reward), but cannot observe the probabilities per se; instead the rat must infer the probabilities
through repeated sampling of an observable variable (does the lever pay out on this trial or not?).
Theoretical accounts of inference (sometimes called learning, as in reinforcement learning) tend
to include two distinct processes for updating beliefs over time. The first process is evidence-driven
updating of beliefs – after each new piece of evidence (such as a reward) is observed, the model is
updated to take into account the new observation. The second process is one that occurs between
observations, as states of the world for which no evidence has necessarily been observed are up-
weighted to account for the possibility that the environment could change before the next observa-
tion. Mathematically this second process is called the transition function as it determines the transi-
tion between posterior beliefs on trial t and prior beliefs on trial t + 1.
These two updating processes differ somewhat, both conceptually and
algorithmically. Conceptually, evidence-driven updating, as the name suggests, is driven by recently
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observed evidence and usually takes into account how that evidence differs from predictions under
a prior belief (e.g., reward prediction error). In contrast, updating under the transition function is
driven by higher order features of the environment such as the inferred level of environmental vola-
tility and structural knowledge about which environmental states tend to follow each other
(Behrens et al., 2007; Meyniel and Dehaene, 2017).
Algorithmic examples of evidence-driven updating would be the value update equation of the
Rescorla-Wagner model, or the application of Bayes’ theorem to combine a new observation with a
prior belief. In contrast, a simple example of a transition function algorithm is a constant ‘leak’ that
up-weights all possible future states of the environment equally, and down-weights beliefs based on
past observations, such that the model’s beliefs constantly decay towards a state of agnosticism (an
example would be the leaky accumulator (Usher and McClelland, 2001)). A more complex transition
function could determine structured changes in the environment, for example by preferentially pre-
dicting that if the environment changes, it changes to a similar state (an example would be the
Gaussian transition function on reward probability (Behrens et al., 2007)).
Put another way, the overall level and distribution of uncertainty in an internal model is controlled
in part by the transition function. When the environment is believed to be changeable
(Behrens et al., 2007), or to have recently changed (Wilson et al., 2010), the transition function
adjusts beliefs so that there is high uncertainty about the state of the world on trial t + 1, even given
what was known at trial t. The optimal level of uncertainty is determined by two opposing forces: if
relatively little uncertainty is added at each transition the model can utilize a longer history of obser-
vations to infer the current state of the world; but if too little uncertainty is added, the model
becomes inflexible.
Previous studies have addressed the question of how the optimal level of uncertainty, and hence
the magnitude of the ‘leak’ or transition function, should be determined by inferring the higher
order statistics of the environment such as its volatility or change-point probabilities. Furthermore,
blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) and pupillometric signals tracking such (optimal) uncertainty
have been observed (Behrens et al., 2007; McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar et al., 2012;
Preuschoff et al., 2011). A second, open question, however, is how the brain gets from calculating
how flexible one’s beliefs should be, to controlling flexibility and uncertainty within a model that rep-
resents the current state of the world.
In relation to the first question, how the optimal level of uncertainty is calculated, Behrens and
colleagues (Behrens et al., 2007) argued that the learning rate (analogous to the magnitude of the
leak) should optimally depend on environmental volatility, and observed that when volatility (hence
learning rate) was high, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was active. O’Reilly and colleagues
(O’Reilly et al., 2013) showed activity in a similar region when participants were instructed that
changes in the environment had occurred. McGuire and colleagues (McGuire et al., 2014) found
activity in ACC associated with belief uncertainty, another model-based measure that should deter-
mine the magnitude of the transition function (in their case, the probability that the model abandons
its prior beliefs entirely in favour of a flat prior).
In relation to the second question, how uncertainty/flexibility is implemented within internal mod-
els, there is less evidence, one reason being that it is difficult to measure the uncertainty of an inter-
nal neural model directly. An intriguing possibility is that increases in neural model uncertainty are
controlled via a neuromodulatory route. In particular noradrenaline has been proposed as a candi-
date mechanism by which the level of uncertainty in neural models of the world may be controlled
(Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Bouret and Sara, 2005; Iigaya, 2016; Martins and Froemke,
2015; Nassar et al., 2012; Preuschoff et al., 2011; Pulcu and Browning, 2017; Yu and Dayan,
2005), and experimental manipulations increasing noradrenaline levels in cortex tend to lead to
increased randomness in behavior (Tervo et al., 2014). One theoretical proposal, that noradrenaline
performs a ‘network reset’ (Bouret and Sara, 2005), is particularly reminiscent of the second, transi-
tion-function updating process described above.
In the current experiment we focussed on the second question above. That is, we attempted to
measure the level of uncertainty within a probabilistic world model, and determine signals that pre-
dicted changes in the level of this uncertainty. These are key components for any candidate mecha-
nism for the implementation of a transition-function that increases uncertainty, such as a leak.
We first established that we could measure uncertainty in a neural representation of a simple task
state space using functional MRI. Then we identified predictors of increases in belief uncertainty, in
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the absence of overt changes in behaviour. In a simple experimental environment (4-arm bandit
task), human participants formed a probabilistic model of the state of the environment (which bandit
has the high pay-out rate) that could be decoded from the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC). This
model represented participants’ certainty about the state of the environment in that the strength of
the representation of the currently selected option, relative to other options, depended on the
strength of evidence experienced, as captured by an optimal observer model. As well as measuring
a neural model with fMRI, we simultaneously measured pupil dilation – an index of neuromodulatory
state, commonly used as a measure of noradrenaline release to cortex. We found changes in pupil
dilation predicted changes in uncertainty in the mOFC state model, providing evidence that the
mechanism for driving up entropy in cortical models of the environment could be neuromodulatory.
In circumstances when model entropy should increase, such as after observations likely to indicate a
change in environmental state, activity in the ACC was observed, which in turn explained the
strength of the pupil dilation response, suggesting ACC may be involved in regulating these neuro-
modulatory processes.
Results
To establish a task environment in which participants were constantly making inferences about the
current state of the environment, we used a 4-arm bandit task (Figure 1a, Figure 1—figure supple-
ment 1). At any given time, one of four response options had a high (70 or 90%) probability of deliv-
ering reward and the other three had a low (20%) probability. The high reward option switched after
a variable number of trials (mean 20 ± SD 5). Participants’ task was therefore to infer the current
state of the environment, i.e. which option was the current high-reward option. Participants were
explicitly instructed about the reward structure before beginning the task. Although there were only
four options available for selection (denoted by a different colour), there were eight options on the
screen at any given time (see Materials and methods for details and motivation). The individual trials
in this task were presented in rapid succession to maximize design efficiency given that we were
interested in a subset of trials.
Participants’ behaviour alternated between exploitation and exploration as they formed and
revised beliefs about the current state of the environment (Figure 1c). 72% of trials on average were
classified as exploit trials (SEM across participants 1.2%); the mean length for an exploitation ’block’
was 13.7 trials (across participants) and the within-subject standard deviation of exploitation block
lengths was (mean across participants) 7.1 trials. In order to classify trials as either exploitative or
exploratory, we used a simple heuristic. We defined the start of a period of exploitation as the first
trial on which participants selected the true high reward probability option and received reward, and
the end of the exploit period as the last trial before switching to a different option (thus within
exploit periods, by definition, all choices were for the same option). The task therefore provided a
clear behavioural marker of the onset of exploration, which was defined as the first trial on which
participants switched away from making this selection. As an aside, in Appendix 1 we explore an
alternative approach (Ebitz et al., 2018) to defining explore and exploit phases using a hidden Mar-
kov model (HMM). This approach yielded a very similar trial classification to the one we used. The
relative merits of the two approaches are discussed in Appendix 1.
The possibility for voluntary exploration in the task created a constant pressure to evaluate
whether the state of the environment had changed. Certainty about the state of the environment
was modelled as the entropy across the state space in a Bayesian ideal observer model. The model,
described in the Methods, had a space of possible states encompassing the possibility that each
option was the current high reward option, and a range of possible pay-out rates; it also had a uni-
form leak.
We defined belief uncertainty as the entropy across the space of four possible states (namely, the
four possible high-reward options, marginalizing over possible pay-out rates):
entropy¼
X
i
p Hið Þ  log p Hið Þð Þ
where Hi is the state that option i is the high reward option. For comparison we defined another
measure of belief uncertainty, relative uncertainty (Wilson et al., 2010), which behaved similarly and
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was highly correlated with entropy (mean correlation across participants r=0.80). The relation
between entropy and relative uncertainty is explored further in Appendix 1.
Model entropy was generally high in the exploit phases and low in the explore phases of the task
(Figure 1d,e); it also tended to be higher when the pay-out rate of the high reward option was
lower. Both high entropy, and high relative uncertainty, made it more likely that participants would
switch from exploitation to exploration following a reward omission (two separate logistic regres-
sions: entropy - t18 = 7.60, p=2.5710
 7; relative uncertainty - t18 = 13.50, p=3.710
 11).
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Figure 1. Task and behaviour. (a) Participants chose freely between four available options on each trial. A total of 8 options were used in the
experiment but only four were used in each run of the task (indicated by option colours: red circles above the fingers denote the available options, and
the dark red circle denotes the selected option). (b) Schematic of a probabilistic model of the state of the environment – the weighting of each option
represents its probability of being the high reward option. When entropy is low, i.e. participants are certain, the weighting of the selected option is
higher than when entropy is high. (c) Example behaviour of a participant. Dot markers denote choices (location in y-dimension indicates which option
was chosen) – grey circles are rewarded and red dots are unrewarded trials. The grey line indicates the true state of the world (high reward option),
which the participant must infer. Note alternating phases of exploration and exploitation – the main analyses presented in the paper refer only to the
exploitation phase in which there are no overt changes of action. (d) Model entropy for the same run as in (c). Note that model entropy is low during
exploit periods but increases following a reward omission (red dots are trials with reward omission). Background shading indicates the pay-out rate of
the high reward option: during low pay-out (70%) exploit periods, indicated in dark grey, entropy tends to remain higher; during high pay-out periods
(light grey) entropy reaches a floor during exploitation. (e) State space of the model – four horizontal tracks represent the four possible states of the
environment; shading indicates the posterior probability assigned to each state by the model (light colours indicate high probability).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.002
The following figure supplements are available for figure 1:
Figure supplement 1. Implementation of the task described in the Main Text and Methods.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.003
Figure supplement 2. Exploitation and exploration engage different brain regions.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.004
Figure supplement 3. Activation related to task factors.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.005
Figure supplement 4. A large amount of the difference between exploitation and exploration is captured by task factors.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.006
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Furthermore, using an action policy defined by fitting two multinomial softmax functions (one for
explore trials, one for exploit) to the option probabilities p Hið Þ, we found that the particpants’
choices were correctly predicted on 95% of exploit trials and 51% of explore trials (chance would be
25%). The importance of using a model for the study was in fact to have a representation of partici-
pants’ latent belief states during phases when their overt behaviour remained stable, rather than to
predict overt changes of behaviour; however the fact that the model could predict behaviour rela-
tively well across all phases of the task speaks to its validity.
The overall distribution of brain activity in explore and exploit phases of the task differed (GLM1,
see Figure 1—figure supplement 2). The explore phase engaged a frontal-parietal action network
and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dorsal anterior cingulate dACC and adjacent preSMA). The
exploit phase engaged medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) and the hippocampus, two regions
known to be engaged in model-based choice (Boorman et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2012;
Noonan et al., 2010; Wikenheiser et al., 2017). In addition to state uncertainty (model entropy),
several factors differed between explore and exploit phases, notably the frequency of response
switching, and the frequency of reward omission. Further analysis (GLM2, Figure 1—figure supple-
ment 3) indicated that response switching and high model entropy (see below for details of model)
predicted activity throughout the frontal parietal network and dorsomedial frontal cortex. Reward
omission predicted activity in dorsomedial frontal cortex only, and reward activated ventral striatum.
Low model entropy predicted activation of medial OFC and hippocampus (Figure 1—figure supple-
ment 3). Most of the differences in activity observed between exploitation and exploration were
explained by these factors (GLM3; Figure 1—figure supplement 4).
However, the main focus of our analysis was the variation in state uncertainty within the exploita-
tion phase of the task, during which the chosen action was by definition constant, and how this
uncertainty may be represented and modulated. By limiting our analysis to core exploitation trials (at
least five trials, and therefore approximately twenty seconds, after the last action switch and at least
five trials before the next action switch; such trials were 25% of all trials (mean across partici-
pants = 201/800 trials, SEM = 7.0)), we were able to identify neural activity concerned with changes
in participants’ beliefs in the absence of changes in overt behaviour. This dissociated uncertainty
about the state of the environment from variability of action. All analyses presented are limited to
this subset of trials unless otherwise stated.
During each exploitation block, participants’ certainty about the state of the environment varied
due to probabilistic reward omission. To generate trial-by-trial estimates of the certainty of partici-
pants’ beliefs to regress against neural responses, we constructed a normative Bayesian learning
model (see Materials and methods). The model inferred the trial-wise probability that each of the
four options was the high reward probability option, based on the data observed by each individual
participant (Figure 1e). For each trial, we calculated the entropy of the model’s posterior probability
distribution over options, based on evidence up to and including that trial (Figure 1d). This was
used as a proxy for the entropy in the participants’ internal model, at the point of feedback on each
trial. Entropy is low when the probability mass of the posterior is mostly over one option, i.e. partici-
pants are certain. Within exploitation phases, model entropy generally decreased over time as par-
ticipants continued exploiting a single option, but increased following probabilistic omissions of
reward, and accordingly depended on the payout rate of the high reward option (70% or 90%
reward) (see Figure 1d,e).
Throughout the next sections of this paper, we discuss the relationship between model entropy
(in our theoretical model) and the level of uncertainty in a neural model of the state of the world.
However, it should be noted that in the current task, the possible states of the environment are sim-
ply the alternatives for which option is the high reward option, that is {option A is high reward
option. . . option D is high reward option}. Thus, in the current task, state and option value are inher-
ently interlinked. It is necessarily the case that high confidence in the currently chosen option (low
entropy state) correlates with that option having a high expected value (mean correlation ± s.e.m: -
0.93 ± 0.005). Thus it should be noted that throughout the subsequent analyses, a low entropy trial,
defined by us as a trial on which one particular option is considered very likely to be the high reward
option, could equivalently be described as a state in which one particular option (the selected one)
has a high expected value and others have a low expected value. In behavioural control more gener-
ally, this association would hold for any world model for which the aim was to determine the
expected value associated with different candidate actions.
Muller et al. eLife 2019;8:e39404. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404 5 of 30
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Decoding a probabilistic representation of beliefs about the state of
the environment
A probabilistic model of the current state of the world should comprise representations of candidate
states, weighted by their probabilities. Recent studies have identified medial OFC as a likely site for
such a probabilistic model in the context of model-based reinforcement learning (Chan et al., 2016;
Schuck et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2014).
In the present task, such a probabilistic internal model could be thought of as a mixture model
comprising representations of the possible options, wherein the strength of the representation of a
given option on each trial is weighted by the belief that option is the high reward probability option
(Figure 1b).
To identify regions that represented the task environment in this probabilistic manner, we used a
multivariate searchlight approach over the whole brain as follows: at each searchlight, in one half of
the data (training set) we identified activity patterns characteristic of trials on which each option was
selected. In the other half of the data (test set) we calculated the trial-wise probability of classifying
as each option (we then swapped training and test sets; see Materials and methods for details).
Simply searching for regions in which we could correctly classify the selected option, we were, as
expected, able to decode at above-chance levels from a broad network of areas including motor
and visual cortex (Figure 2a). A plot of the probability of decoding each action from visual cortex
(Figure 2c, top) and motor cortex (Figure 2c, middle) reveals a representational structure that is
sensitive to spatial and motor factors; the most likely options to be decoded, other than the actually
selected option, are those corresponding to the chosen hand (and equivalently, the chosen visual
hemifield).
However, the defining feature of a probabilistic model is that the relative weighting of the chosen
option should depend on certainty, as shown in schematic Figure 1b. To search for regions that had
this property, we defined a trial-wise summary measure of representation strength as the ratio of the
odds of classifying the trial as the chosen option, to the odds of classifying it as one of the unchosen
options. This odds-ratio measure captured the extent to which the chosen option was represented
more strongly than unchosen alternatives on each trial. Finally, we regressed trial-by-trial model
entropy (as a proxy for the entropy of participants’ beliefs) against representation strength (GLM4).
This identified areas in which representation strength for the chosen option was higher when there
was higher certainty that the chosen option was the high reward option.
Using this approach we identified a region in mOFC (peak = 10,40,–22; Figure 2b) in which
representation strength for the exploited option was higher when model entropy was lower (cor-
rected for multiple comparisons using permutation testing; cluster mass p<0.05 corrected with a
cluster forming threshold of p=0.001). This was the only cluster to survive multiple comparisons cor-
rection. The same effect was also detectable in the hippocampus (t(18)=-2.11 p<0.05 uncorrected at
an ROI centered on the peak voxel 34, -14, -16 for the exploit vs. explore univariate contrast from
GLM 1; Figure 1—figure supplement 2). However the effect in hippocampus did not survive whole
brain correction for multiple comparisons and should therefore be treated with caution.
The weighted representation of option preferences observed in mOFC is consistent with a proba-
bilistic internal model of the environment, whereby the currently selected option has a higher decod-
ing probability when model entropy is low (Figure 1b and Figure 2c, bottom). It is distinct from an
action/policy representation, in which the representation of options is not modulated by entropy, as
was observed in visual and motor areas (Figure 2c, top and middle).
To probe the robustness of the mOFC result, we repeated the analysis using two measures other
than the model entropy regressor to predict representation strength. Entropy is a summary measure
of the uncertainty across options; low entropy could arise from any of the four options being repre-
sented more strongly than the others. To check that the result was specific to the current state of
the environment, we repeated the above analysis but instead of model entropy, used the probability
(belief) assigned by the model that the currently exploited option is the high reward option as the
predictor variable (GLM5). This also produced a specific effect in the medial OFC (Figure 2—figure
supplement 1). To confirm our result was not dependent on the particular learning model we used,
we simply compared representation strength during exploit periods with high and low payout rates.
When the pay-out rate of the exploited, high reward option was 90% vs. 70%, representation
strength was higher in mOFC (Figure 2—figure supplement 1).
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Figure 2. Probabilistic beliefs represented in mOFC. (a) The currently selected option can be decoded above
chance, as expected, in motor and visual cortex (t score map for above chance decoding of the chosen option
across subjects; thresholded at p<0.001; corrected for multiple comparisons). (b) Medial OFC represents the
Figure 2 continued on next page
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What is the nature of the representation in mOFC?
The multivariate whole brain analysis showed that the identity of the chosen option could be
decoded with greater confidence (representation strength was higher) when model entropy was
low. Whilst OFC has been proposed as the site of a representation of the current state of the world
(Schuck et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2014), it is also concerned with value representation. Trials with
low model entropy in our task tended to be the same trials on which a high value option was chosen
(an option which the participant believed had a high probability of leading to a reward), and trials
on which recent reward history contained few reward omissions.
The reason we interpret the multivariate results as evidence for a probabilistic representation of
the current state (which option is the current high reward option) is that our ability to decode the
identity of the chosen option from mOFC (indexed as representation strength for the identity of that
option) was higher when the participant’s uncertainty (model entropy) was lower. Therefore decod-
ing is driven by the relative weightings of representations of specific options rather than decoding a
general value representation. Indeed, the training and test sets used in the analysis both included
cases where the option value was higher and lower, which was unknown to the classifier. We exam-
ined whether our effects still held after regressing out a univariate effect of option value by repeat-
ing the analysis after first regressing out the effect of value from univariate activity in each voxel in
the mOFC region of interest. The effect of model entropy on representation strength remained sig-
nificant (t(18)=-7.62,p<0.001). This was also true when regressing out recent reward history (whether
the current and previous three trials were rewarded) in addition to value (t(18)=-7.26,p<0.001) from
voxelwise activity before carrying out multivariate analysis. Since these analyses were performed on
the residual voxelwise data after the effect of value (or reward history) on voxelwise activity was
removed, univariate option value could not drive the classification. Regardless, given the decoding
effects were on specific option identities, decoding a general value representation cannot explain
our results. Rather the decoding must be driven by different relative weightings of specific option
representations, consistent with a probabilistic state representation.
We should reiterate here that in the current task, state and option value are inherently interlinked
because the possible states of the environment are simply the alternatives for which is the high
reward option, i.e. {option A is high reward option. . . option D is high reward option}. Whilst it is the
representation strength of state identity that depends on uncertainty, the states themselves are
defined in terms of option value. Therefore the present results in no way speak against the hypothe-
sis that mOFC represents option values; in fact the opposite is true.
Figure 2 continued
current state of the task probabilistically. Highlighted voxels are the centers of searchlights in which the
representation strength for the chosen option was higher when model entropy was low (i.e. when participants
have high certainty about the state of the environment; t score map for the effect of model entropy on
representation strength; thresholded at p<0.001; corrected for multiple comparisons). (c) Region of interest
analyses demonstrating multivariate decoding patterns. Left column: the multivariate classifier probability that
each option was selected; on trials when model entropy was low (dark red) and high (light red). Right column:
decoding accuracy (i.e. proportion of trials when the option with the highest probability of having been selected
by the classifier was indeed the option selected by the participant) in low and high entropy trials. All error bars are
SEM. Dashed lines denote chance. Top row and middle row: decoding in visual and motor cortices, respectively, is
not sensitive to model entropy and errors in decoding tend to be to neighbouring options. Bottom row: decoding
in mOFC is modulated by model entropy, such that decoding is higher when model entropy is low.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.007
The following figure supplements are available for figure 2:
Figure supplement 1. Representation strength in mOFC is explained by probability assigned to the currently
selected option, as well as the difference between high and low reward exploit periods.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.008
Figure supplement 2. Histogram of t scores for the effect of entropy on representation strength (GLM4) for null
data produced by shuffling voxel identities prior to PCA.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.009
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A candidate neuromodulatory mechanism for increasing flexibility of
belief representations
Having confirmed that a probabilistic model of the state of the world is represented in the brain, we
went on to ask how entropy in that model might be controlled. An intriguing possibility is that
increases in neural model uncertainty are controlled via a neuromodulatory route. The
neuromodulator noradrenaline has been proposed as a candidate mechanism by which the level of
uncertainty in neural models of the world may be controlled (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005;
Bouret and Sara, 2005; Iigaya, 2016; Martins and Froemke, 2015; Nassar et al., 2012;
Preuschoff et al., 2011; Pulcu and Browning, 2017; Yu and Dayan, 2005). Noradrenaline is pro-
duced in the locus coeruleus (LC), and is released very broadly in the cerebral cortex including the
mOFC (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005).
We used baseline pupil size (mean pupil area in the 20 ms before outcome presentation,
expressed as % signal change relative to the participant’s mean pupil area over the task run) to index
neuromodulatory state. Pupil size has primarily been interpreted in the literature as indexing nor-
adrenaline levels, although the muscles controlling pupil size are sensitive to both noradrenaline and
acetylcholine. Changes in pupil diameter have been linked to single-unit activity in the (noradrener-
gic) LC (Joshi et al., 2016). Recent physiological work has demonstrated that both noradrenaline
and acetylcholine as measured in cortex, are associated with pupil size (Reimer et al., 2016); levels
of both noradrenaline and acetylcholine were correlated with pupil dilation over a time course of up
to a few seconds (a similar time course to the interval between trials in the current experiment).
Therefore our pupillometry results cannot be interpreted as specific to noradrenaline but rather
reflect a complex combination of neuromodulatory and other factors. However, Reimer et al. (2016)
also report that noradrenaline, but not acetylcholine, was correlated with changes in pupil dilation
(the temporal derivative of pupil size) as well as pupil size itself, which favours a noradrenergic inter-
pretation of our pupillometry results (most of the pupillometry results reported below concern
changes in pupil size rather than pupil size per se). However, we must emphasise that pupillometry is
a very indirect measure of neuromodulation and although we mostly interpret our results in the con-
text of noradrenaline due to the extensive literature on pupillometry and noradrenaline, as well as
influential theories and experimental work linking noradrenaline to uncertainty, model updating and
exploration, we note that our pupil size data cannot be specifically linked to noradrenaline over
other pupil-linked arousal factors such as acetylcholine.
Baseline pupil size was larger in explore than exploit trials (Figure 3a, left), and increased when
transitioning into exploration (Figure 3—figure supplement 1). On a trial-by-trial basis, reward
omission produced a sustained increase in pupil size following feedback (Figure 3a, right).
We hypothesized that pupil dilation would predict changes in the level of uncertainty in the inter-
nal model. To test this hypothesis, we carried out a linear regression (GLM6) in which the change in
baseline pupil size from one trial to the next was used to predict changes in representation strength
in the mOFC from one trial to the next. In other words, we asked whether change in pupil size
induced by observation of an outcome predicted decreases in representation strength between that
trial and the next, providing evidence for changes in neuromodulatory state applying something
analogous to a leak to the posterior belief or partial network reset (Bouret and Sara, 2005). The
OFC representation strength was extracted from a region of interest (searchlight center) defined on
the peak result shown in Figure 2b (change in model entropy was included as a co-regressor of no
interest).
This analysis indicated that changes in baseline pupil size indeed explained changes in represen-
tation strength in mOFC; as expected, this relationship was negative, such that increases in pupil
size predicted decreases in representation strength. Interestingly, this relationship was limited to
unrewarded trials (t(15)=-2.94, p=0.01); within the subset of rewarded trials there was no relationship
(t(15)=0.37, p=0.71; difference between rewarded and unrewarded: t(15)=2.82, p=0.01; Figure 3b).
This is significant because (due to the 4-arm nature of the task and the fact that we included only
exploitation trials in the analysis) increases in uncertainty occurred almost exclusively following
reward omissions – on only 0.2% of core exploit trials (10/3833 trials over all participants) did uncer-
tainty increase following a rewarded trial. Therefore the relationship between pupil dilation and
change in representation strength seems to hold in cases where uncertainty is increasing, but not
when it is decreasing. To test the temporal specificity of the result, we shifted the pupil and OFC
Muller et al. eLife 2019;8:e39404. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404 9 of 30
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Figure 3. Neuromodulatory systems as a candidate mechanism for increasing flexibility of belief representations. (a) Pupil size mean timecourses
throughout a trial. Left: mean timecourses shown for all trials as well as trials split according to whether they were explore or exploit trials, revealing a
larger pupil size in exploration than exploitation. Right: splitting trials according to whether the trial was rewarded or not reveals a sustained increase in
pupil size following omission of reward. Shaded regions denote SEM. (b) Change in pupil diameter predicts changes in representation strength in
mOFC on exploit trials. Beta weights for the effect of change in pupil diameter on change in representation strength are significantly below zero. This is
true only on trials when reward was omitted. Error bars are SEM. (c) Performing this analysis as a whole brain reveals, again, a relatively localized effect
in mOFC (t score map shown, thresholded at p<0.01, uncorrected; analysis performed on unrewarded exploit trials). (d) Median split on unrewarded
exploit trials reveals that on trials when pupil change is high, change in representation strength is more negative than when pupil change is lower, in
mOFC. Error bars are SEM. (e) Left: ACC region active when model entropy increased. Right: ACC region in which activity predicted changes in pupil
Figure 3 continued on next page
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signals relative to one another and recomputed the effect. We found that the result was no longer
significant when shifting the signals in any direction (p>0.1 for all analyses), suggesting the effect
was temporally specific to change in pupil size predicting change in representation strength from
the current trial to the next. This effect remained significant when regressing out value from the uni-
variate signal before fitting the multivariate model, as discussed above (unrewarded: t(15)=-3.07,
p<0.01; rewarded: t(15)=0.56, p=0.58; difference: t(15)=2.95, p<0.01).
Although we focus here on the exploitation phase, we found this result replicated in the mOFC
ROI when including only explore trials in the analysis (Figure 3—figure supplement 2; unrewarded:
t(15)=-2.38, p=0.03; rewarded: t(15)=0.97, p=0.35; difference: t(15)=-2.23, p=0.04).
Furthermore, performing the analysis on unrewarded exploit trials over the whole brain reveals a
region relatively localized to mOFC (Figure 3c). To illustrate this result further, we took the unre-
warded exploit trials and looked at the change in representation strength in the mOFC ROI on trials
separated according to a median split on change in pupil diameter. As expected, we found change
in representation strength was more negative when change in pupil dilation was higher (Figure 3d;
t(15) = 2.72, p=0.02).
These results demonstrate that on trials when evidence against the current belief is observed
(unrewarded trials), the change in uncertainty in the neural model is predicted by changes in pupil
diameter, suggesting a role for neuromodulation in control of uncertainty in neural models. The fact
the relationship is specific to unrewarded trials suggests that the relationship between pupil dilation
and representation strength in mOFC is directionally specific to the process of increasing, not
decreasing, model entropy.
Anterior cingulate cortex is activated when model entropy increases
and predicts pupil change
Having provided evidence that neural model uncertainty may be increased via pupil-
linked neuromodulatory mechanisms, we next asked which brain regions are engaged during
increases in uncertainty and may regulate changes in neuromodulatory systems. We used a whole
brain GLM analysis to identify regions that were sensitive to increases in model entropy, even in the
absence of overt action switches (analysis again limited to exploit trials as defined above; GLM7).
This analysis identified activity in the ACC and adjacent preSMA that was directionally sensitive to
change in entropy (Figure 3e, left). The greater the increase in entropy from the previous to current
trial, the greater the activity in the ACC and surrounding regions of the dmPFC – that is, these
regions were more active when entropy was increasing and less active when it was decreasing. These
results are consistent with the observation ACC has been associated with the processing of feedback
that should lead to changes of belief (O’Reilly et al., 2013).
Figure 3 continued
dilation, over and above the effect of increase in model entropy and mean brain activity. Both thresholded at p<0.001 and corrected for multiple
comparisons.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.010
The following figure supplements are available for figure 3:
Figure supplement 1. Task-related pupil size changes are not explained by outcome stimulus type.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.012
Figure supplement 2. The relationship between change in baseline pupil diameter and change in representation strength in mOFC replicates in
explore trials.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.014
Figure supplement 3. ACC activity explains changes in baseline pupil size across all trials.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.015
Figure supplement 4. ACC is engaged when transitioning from exploitation to exploration.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.016
Figure supplement 5. Individual pupil effects.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.011
Figure supplement 6. Breaking central fixation does not alter pupil effects.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.013
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ACC is one of the few cortical regions reported to have an afferent influence on the
noradrenergic LC (Jodo et al., 1998) . This provides at least one anatomical route by which,
if ACC is responsible for computing changes in beliefs, it may be able to broadcast increases in
uncertainty to other brain regions via a neuromodulatory route. To probe the relationship between
ACC and pupillometric effects, we asked where in the brain univariate activity predicts changes in
baseline pupil size. We conducted a whole brain GLM analysis, again focused on the exploit period,
in which univariate brain activity at each voxel was the predictor variable and change in pupil size
the dependent variable; change in model entropy was included as a co-regressor. Pupil dilation is
globally correlated with neural gain (Eldar et al., 2013), and we observed a strong correlation of
pupil size with mean BOLD signal across the entire grey matter. When we controlled for this global
effect by including mean activity across the grey matter as a co-regressor of no interest (GLM8), we
observed a localized effect in ACC such that ACC activity on a given trial predicted the change in
baseline pupil size from that trial to the next (Figure 3e, right; more activity in the brain associated
with a greater increase in pupil dilation; corrected for multiple comparisons using permutation test-
ing; p<0.05 at cluster forming threshold of p=0.001). Although we focus on the exploit period, this
result is also present when conducting the analysis across all trials (Figure 3—figure supplement 3).
Given that ACC activity predicts pupil dilation and pupil dilation predicts changes in representa-
tion strength in mOFC, we tested whether there was a direct relationship between ACC activity and
changes in representation strength in mOFC. However, there was no evidence for such a relationship
(activity extracted from an ROI defined on peak of the ACC effect from either GLM7 or GLM8 did
not have a significant relationship with change in representation strength in mOFC; p>0.1 for all trial
subsets tested). This may reflect the fact that both brain measures have relatively low SNR compared
to the pupillometry data, to which both were significantly related.
Although we focus on the exploitation phase in which overt behavior was stable, it is worth noting
that a very similar pattern of activity in medial prefrontal cortex was present when participants
switched from exploitation to exploration (GLM2, Figure 3—figure supplement 4). The activity
observed in ACC in this analysis is activity over and above that driven by changing response/option
selection (GLM2), which (by definition) occurs on the last trial of exploitation. Note that this effect is
specific to exploration initiation, and was not observed when switching strategy from exploitation to
exploration (Figure 3—figure supplement 4), suggesting a particular role in disengaging from the
exploited strategy.
Discussion
We set out to investigate the mechanisms by which entropy in neural models of the world may be
controlled, particularly mechanisms by which entropy may be increased. We identified patterns of
activity indicative of a probabilistic model of the environment in the medial OFC. The hallmark of
this probabilistic model is that it has stronger representation strength for the currently selected
option when model entropy is low. This is distinct from sensory and motoric representations in visual
and motor cortex that are not sensitive to model entropy. Changes in representation strength in
medial OFC, over and above those predicted by our task model, were explained by change in pupil
dilation, a proxy measure for neuromodulator activity. Pupil dilation was in turn predicted by activity
in the ACC – a region also active when model entropy increased.
That an internal model of the task is represented in mOFC is consistent with the proposal that
this region represents the current location in task state space (Wilson et al., 2014), and in particular
represents information that is hidden to participants but required to solve the task (Chan et al.,
2016; Schuck et al., 2016). Our work extends this proposal to include the representation of the
strength of dynamic beliefs in a probabilistic task in which participants infer the hidden option-
reward contingencies that define their location in the task state space.
The fact that mOFC is the locus of the probabilistic model in the current task is probably due to
the choice of task, as mOFC plays a key role in representing stimulus-action-outcome contingencies
during model-based action (Jones et al., 2012). Different stimulus or task domains could rely on
probabilistic models represented in other, task relevant parts of cortex. Furthermore, the exact
nature of the representation we are interrogating in mOFC is an interesting avenue for future
research. For example, it is possible the representation we observe here reflects the online represen-
tation of option-reward contingencies required to guide choice – for example, for online comparison
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– and is not where the option-reward contingencies are stored offline, which may be in another
region such as hippocampus (Boorman et al., 2016) or striatum (Packard and Knowlton, 2002).
The hippocampus showed some limited evidence of probabilistic option representations in the cur-
rent study. The striatum also plays a key role in representing action-outcome associations, and
indeed mechanisms for maintaining flexibility within these representations have been proposed
(Franklin and Frank, 2015). In the current study we were unable to detect evidence of a probabilis-
tic model in the striatum. This could be because our multivariate analysis relied upon patterns across
many voxels and was therefore relatively less sensitive to effects in small structures. Regardless of its
exact nature, we are able to use the probabilistic model of the task space detected in mOFC as an
index of the neural representation of participants’ beliefs; that is, a neural measure of an internal
model.
We next sought evidence for a role of neuromodulatory systems in increasing uncertainty in such
an internal model. Although most theoretical work in this field has focussed on noradrenaline, it
should be noted that our results concern pupil dilation, not noradrenaline per se. Pupil dilation
depends on at least two neuromodulators (noradrenaline and acetylcholine) (Joshi et al., 2016;
Reimer et al., 2016), as well as other arousal-related factors, so our results cannot be linked directly
to noradrenaline.
A large body of theoretical work has ascribed noradrenaline various functions relating to the
modification of internal models (changing gain (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005), network resets
(Bouret and Sara, 2005), and signalling unexpected uncertainty (Preuschoff et al., 2011; Yu and
Dayan, 2005)). However, evidence for the impact of noradrenaline on internal models has been rela-
tively sparse, partly due to the requirement of measuring the internal model. In one significant
rodent study, increasing noradrenaline results in broader – less selective – tuning curves of auditory
neurons (akin to a network reset) (Martins and Froemke, 2015). Such an impact on representations
is what is required for noradrenaline to implement its proposed role in belief updating
(Nassar et al., 2012) and increased weighting of current evidence versus prior belief on choice
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2017). By simultaneously measuring pupil size and an internal model in
mOFC, we observed changes in pupil diameter predict increases in uncertainty in an internal model,
demonstrating a potential analog of this rodent work in humans performing complex decision-mak-
ing tasks, and suggesting a broad role of pupil-linked neuromodulation in reducing selectivity of cor-
tical representations.
We then asked which brain regions contain signals associated with changes in the certainty of
beliefs and may be involved in regulating the pupil-linked neuromodulatory system. We found ACC
tracked changes in the certainty of beliefs, consistent with observations that it monitors the out-
comes of one’s actions (Walton et al., 2004), predicts the updating of beliefs (Behrens et al.,
2007), and is specifically engaged when internal models need to be updated (O’Reilly et al., 2013).
ACC was particularly involved when uncertainty should increase, consistent with its role in explor-
atory behavior (Hayden et al., 2011) and information seeking (Stoll et al., 2016). While the present
study provides evidence for this role of ACC, it was not designed to dissociate it from other roles
ascribed to ACC, such as cognitive control (Shenhav et al., 2013) and choice difficulty
(Shenhav et al., 2014). Rather, we double dissociate ACC from other regions representing an inter-
nal model (mOFC), and provide evidence ACC may broadcast information to such regions via neuro-
modulatory systems.
Anatomical work suggests ACC is one of the few cortical regions with descending control on nor-
adrenaline release (Jodo et al., 1998). Further, recent studies have shown that activity of ACC neu-
rons predicts pupil dilation and may temporally lead pupil-predicting LC activity (Ebitz and Platt,
2015; Joshi et al., 2016). Therefore it is anatomically plausible that ACC could influence belief
uncertainty via the noradrenaline system, possibly amongst other routes. However, whilst both ACC
and noradrenaline have been implicated in belief updating (Karlsson et al., 2012; O’Reilly et al.,
2013) and setting the learning rate (Behrens et al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2012), evidence for their
suspected (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Karlsson et al., 2012; Nassar et al., 2012) coordination
during tasks requiring belief updating has been lacking. Here we found ACC activity explained
changes in baseline pupil dilation, over and above the effect of changes in uncertainty and mean
brain activity. Whilst our pupil results cannot be linked directly to noradrenaline, they are compatible
with the hypothesis that the noradrenaline system could offer a mechanism via which the computa-
tion of uncertainty of beliefs in ACC may be broadcast to internal models.
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An alternative explanation for the relationship between ACC and pupil dilation is that they are
associated, not with a change in beliefs, but with a change in the drive to produce exploratory
behavioural output. The circumstances in which model entropy should increase are the same circum-
stances that should drive participants towards exploratory (random) behavior. Indeed, increasing
noradrenaline release to the ACC has been associated with the output of stochastic behavior
(Tervo et al., 2014). However, an account in which ACC activity and noradrenaline release only track
a drive to produce stochastic behavioural output, or to explore, cannot account for the association
between pupil dilation and the increase in model uncertainty recorded in mOFC, in the absence of
any behavioural change. Further, the animal work described above (Martins and Froemke, 2015)
provides causal evidence that noradrenaline reduces selectivity of cortical representations, support-
ing the proposed role for noradrenaline in reducing the strength of beliefs, in addition to its role of
increasing stochastic behaviour (Tervo et al., 2014). This hypothesis can be summarized in terms of
economic models of choice as arguing that noradrenaline input to ACC alters the temperature
parameter of a softmax choice model whereas noradrenaline input to internal models (mOFC) alters
the option values, resulting in behavioural stochasticity (Tervo et al., 2014) and entropic beliefs
(present results), respectively.
We started by asking whether there was a mechanism for increasing uncertainty in neural models.
The results presented, in which increases in belief uncertainty engage ACC, which explains changes
in pupil size, that in turn explain changes to the selectivity of internal models following evidence the
underlying state of the world has changed (reward omission), provide a candidate mechanism. These
results suggest different neural mechanisms may be engaged when forming as compared to revising
beliefs, and that neuromodulatory systems may play a crucial role in implementing flexibility of inter-
nal representations during decision-making in humans.
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty-two healthy human volunteers participated in the experiment. Participant identities were
anonymized for analyses. All participants were right-handed, aged between 20 and 31 (mean age:
26), and eight were female. All participants had normal or corrected to normal (with contact lenses)
vision. Three participants had to be excluded because of technical difficulties with fMRI, and three
had to be excluded from pupil analyses because of technical difficulties with eyetracking in the fMRI
scanner. Power analyses are as follows. For univariate effects of model updating: Based on a previ-
ously published result demonstrating an effect of model updating in the ACC (O’Reilly et al., 2013),
we performed a simple a-priori power calculation. This effect from O’Reilly et al. (2013) had a
Cohen’s d of 0.89; for this effect size, 80% power and an alpha level of 0.05 (one tailed) the mini-
mum sample size was calculated as 17 subjects. For multivariate effects, no a priori power calcula-
tions were performed as effect sizes for multivariate analysis are notoriously hard to estimate in
advance, depend on the type of information to be decoded and vary across cortical regions – given
that we used a whole brain searchlight approach this would make it very difficult to pre-specify an
effect size (Bhandari et al., 2018). We present a posteriori power calculations because of a reviewer
request. The effect size (Cohen’s d) for the key result that representation strength is predicted by
model entropy was d = 1.58. For a power of 80% and alpha = 0.05 one tailed, the minimum sample
size was calculated at six individuals. Whilst we would not be confident in a result based on such a
small sample, we note that the regression analysis did give a negative regression coefficient (high
entropy predicts low representation strength) in 18/19 individuals in our group. For comparison,
Schuck et al (Schuck et al., 2016) decoded task states from a similar medial OFC region to that
found in the present study, in an a priori ROI. Their effect size (accuracy of decoding task state vs.
chance) was d = 1.77, which would suggest a minimum sample size of 5. For pupillometry effects,
the most relevant study in the literature is Nassar et al. (2012). In this study the effect size for a
regression of pupil average (similar to our baseline pupil measure) on relative uncertainty yielded an
effect size of d = 0.94, which would suggest a minimum sample size of 16 for this analysis. We col-
lected data from a number of participants satisfying the estimated size effects, and in line with other
papers in the field. The study was approved by a local University of Oxford ethics committee (ref:
MSD-IDREC-C1-2013-171), and all participants gave written informed consent.
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Task
Participants were presented with eight options (Figure 1a, Figure 1—figure supplement 1), four of
which were available for selection in each run of the task (participants completed four runs of the
task – see below). The four available options were distinguished from unavailable options by their
colour (blue or red, counterbalanced across participants). They were instructed that of the four avail-
able options, one had a high and the remainders a low probability of giving rise to reward, if
selected. Participants selected, on each trial, any and only one of the four available options by press-
ing its corresponding button. Following this selection, reward was delivered probabilistically accord-
ing to whether the option selected was the high probability (70 or 90% probability of reward) or one
of the low probability (20%) options, and was displayed on the screen at the time of outcome.
The participants’ objective was to accumulate as much reward as possible. Hence, the optimal
strategy was to always select the high reward-probability option. This high reward option moved
randomly to one of the three other options after a variable number of trials (mean 20 trials, SD 5)
and independently of the participants’ behaviour – adding to the unpredictability (due to the vari-
able length of the exploratory period). When the high reward option moved, it was randomly
selected with equal probability to have a 70 or 90% chance of reward delivery. The task was embed-
ded in a game in which participants controlled a mouse seeking cheese (Figure 1—figure supple-
ment 1). Following selection of an option, the mouse moved to the option and the outcome (reward
or no reward; cheese or apple, counterbalanced across participants) was revealed and remained on
the screen for 200 ms. The next trial began soon after (jittered with a uniform distribution between 0
and 4 s; mean ITI of 3.44 s). The short spacing between trials was necessary, as we required large
numbers of trials to drive participants between many periods of exploitation and exploration and
because we focused our analysis on a subset of trials. The close trial spacing was also designed to
encourage a sense of consistent engagement with a particular strategy within exploit blocks.
Participants completed two sessions – one behavioural and pupillometry only, and one addition-
ally with fMRI – each containing four runs of 200 trials (1600 trials total per participant). The available
(blue/red) stimuli switched across runs (see below). Before the first session, participants were given
detailed instructions of the task. These included underlying statistics: they were explicitly told the
probabilities of reward, although not the true underlying frequency at which the high reward proba-
bility jumped. Participants were told the probabilities so they would have comparable understanding
of the task when doing the fMRI session. Selecting each of the eight options corresponds to a button
press for each of the eight fingers. Before starting the first session, participants were trained on the
mappings between the response buttons and the options by doing 300 trials of a training task,
whereby one option would be highlighted and they would be required to press the corresponding
response button. After this, they performed the four runs of the task in the behavioural session. The
following day, participants completed the fMRI session, which similarly required participants to com-
plete four runs of the task. The task and all instructions were the same across the two sessions. Par-
ticipants were additionally instructed to centrally fixate the fixation cross throughout the whole
experiment in both the behavioural and fMRI session.
The motive for having eight options but only four of which were available for selection was to test
whether there was any difference between options available for selection but not selected and those
not available for selection. The configuration of available options differed across the runs such that
all options were available in two of the runs (to allow for training and testing sets of the multivariate
model). Therefore the unavailable options were intended to act as a baseline. Analyses testing for
differences between available but not selected and unavailable options did not yield significant
results (data not shown).
Modelling of behaviour
In order to generate regressors to analyse neural data, we constructed a normative Bayesian learning
model that reflected information communicated to participants – specifically, that one option had a
high probability of reward and the remainders a low probability of reward.
We implemented a normative Bayesian learning model to simulate how belief uncertainty should
change depending on trial history. The model had information that reflected that which was commu-
nicated to participants. We informed participants that there was always and only one location with
an either 70 or 90% probability of receiving reward and the remainders only 20%. The model
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estimated the probability that each of four hypotheses Ht 2 1; 2; 3; 4f g is correct – one hypothesis
for each of the four locations that could be chosen on any given trial Lt 2 1; 2; 3; 4f g being the high
reward-probability location. In each of these hypotheses, the three low probability locations were
assigned p(reward)= 0.2, which was fixed. The other, high reward-probability location was assigned
probability P, where P could take any value in the range 0.3 to 1. We allowed P to be more flexible
to allow for possible differences in participants’ estimates of probabilities, but constrained it to be
greater than the default payoff of 0.2 by imposing a lower bound of p=0.3.
This information can be thought of as represented in a payout matrix – a matrix whose elements
correspond to a probability of reward being delivered. The payout, or outcome, on trial t, Ot, was
determined by a binomial distribution parameterised by q:
Ot ~B qð Þ
where q was obtained from the payout matrix M. M depends on which location is the true high
reward-probability location H, what the payout probability P at the high reward-probability location
is, and which location L was selected on that trial.
The posterior probability that each location was the correct one, H, and the payout probability P
takes some value p, was found by considering the payout probability q associated with the cell
(h; Lt; p) in the payout matrix:
p Ht ¼ h\Pt ¼ pjO1:t;L1:tð Þ ¼ p q¼ Mh;l;pjO1:t ;L1:t
  
The posterior probability over q, p q¼ Mh;l;pjO1:t;L1:t
  
; was given using Bayes’ rule:
p q¼ Mh;l;pjO1:t ;L1:t
  
/ p Ot jq¼Mh;Lt ;p
  
 p q¼Mh;Lt ;pjO1:t 1;L1:t 1s
  
The likelihood p Ot jq¼Mh;l;p;Lt
  
was simply:
p Ot jq¼Mh;Lt ;p
  
¼
Mh;Lt ;p for Ot ¼ 1
1 Mh;Lt ;p for Ot ¼ 0

meaning that the likelihood distribution was a 2D matrix over
h¼ 1;2;3;4f g  p¼ 0:3:0:01:1:0f g
The prior p q¼Mh;Lt ;pjO1:t 1;L1:t 1s
  
was none other than the probability of the values H=h and P=p,
given all previous observations and the switch probability s:
p q¼ Mh;l;pjO1:t 1;L1:t 1; s
  
¼ p Ht ¼ h\Pt ¼ pjO1:t 1;L1:t 1; sð Þ
This was obtained from the previous trial’s posterior after accounting for the possibility of a switch in
H with a leak. The probability of a switch s was fixed and modelled as 1/20. This reflects the true
underlying mean frequency of a switch, but was unknown to participants (we could model this flexi-
bly – however, once in the fMRI session, participants likely have a rough gauge of how frequently
there is a switch due to having already completed 800 trials of the task in the behavioural session).
The prior was therefore given by:
p Ht ¼ h\Pt ¼ pjO1:t 1;L1:t 1; sð Þ ¼ p Ht ¼ h\Pt ¼ pjO1:t 1;L1:t 1; sð Þ  1  sð Þ½ þ p Ht ¼ h\Pt ¼ pjU Mð Þð Þ  s
where U Mð Þ  s is a uniform leak over the parameter space, weighted by s, allowing the model to ‘for-
get’ past outcomes (otherwise the estimates in the posterior will just converge to the mean of all
estimates).
To obtain the model entropy over Hypotheses (i.e. the spread of belief over which of the four
possible locations was the high reward location), we marginalized over p:
p H ¼ hjO1:t;L1:t ; sð Þ ¼
p
X
p H ¼ h; P¼ pjO1:t ;L1:t; sð Þ
This gave the marginalised posterior shown in Figure 1e. We then applied the formula for Entropy:
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ENT ¼  
X4
h¼1
p H ¼ hjO1:t 1;L1:t; sð Þ log p H ¼ hjO1:t 1;L1:t; sð Þð Þ
This was the equation that gave the entropy regressor used in analyses and shown in Figure 1d.
fMRI acquisition and preprocessing
In the fMRI session, four blocks, or runs, of functional data were acquired, with mean ~12 min each.
Data were acquired on a 3T Siemens TIM Prisma, using a 64-channel head and neck coil. Functional
scans were collected using a gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence, Multi-band 4, with
TR = 1.35 s, TE = 32 ms, flip angle = 74 degrees, and voxel resolution of 222 mm. Structural
scans were acquired using a T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence, 111 mm voxels. All scans were of
axial orientation angled to ACPC, covering the whole brain.
Preprocessing and univariate analysis of fMRI data was performed using tools from fMRI Expert
Analysis Tool (FEAT), part of FMRIB’s Software Library (FSL). Data were preprocessed using the
FEAT default options. Registration of EPI images to high-resolution structural images and to stan-
dard (MNI) space was performed using FMRIB’s Linear and Non-Linear Registration Tool, respec-
tively (FLIRT and FNIRT). For GLMs run using FEAT, the four runs of the task for each participant
were pooled using fixed effects, and then high-level analyses across participants were performed
using mixed effects analyses. For the multivariate and pupil-brain analyses, data was concatenated
across runs for each participant and then the GLM was run. These GLMs contained a bias term for
each run separately to remove any differences across runs (i.e. the GLM had four bias/main effect
regressors, each with ones for one of the runs and zeros for the other three).
fMRI analyses
For univariate brain GLMs, we locked each trial event to the time of outcome presentation and con-
volved the BOLD signal with the canonical HRF. The same was performed for generating whole-brain
beta maps for the multivariate analyses, which were then used to calculate representation strength
(see fMRI multivariate measure of representation strength). We then ran the following GLMs that are
presented in the main paper, where the dependent variable was either univariate brain activity, mul-
tivariate representation strength, or change in baseline pupil diameter. Analyses were carried out
either on all trials or only included trials in the exploit period that were at least five trials from the
adjacent explore periods so that any variation is not due to changes in action. These GLMs are spec-
ified below:
GLM1 included the following regressors: Exploit, explore. Dependent variable: Univariate brain
activity. A [1 -1] contrast tested for differences between exploitation and exploration, with positive
activation indicating regions more active in exploitation than exploration, and vice versa for negative
activations. All trials included in the analysis. The goal of this analysis was to identify regions that
were differentially active in exploitation and exploration phases of the task.
GLM2 included the following regressors: Main effect (bias; column of ones), entropy, whether
reward was delivered at outcome, whether participants changed their choice on the subsequent
trial, whether participants transitioned from exploitation to exploration on the subsequent trial (last
exploit trial), whether participants transitioned from exploration to exploitation on the subsequent
trial (first exploit trial). Dependent variable: univariate brain activity. All trials included in the analysis.
The goal of this analysis was to identify regions sensitive to certain task factors, as well as to test for
regions with activity at the transitions between exploitation and exploration (over and above that
explained by the other task regressors, such as switching options).
GLM3 included the following regressors: Exploit, explore, and all the regressors from GLM2
except the main effect regressor. Dependent variable: Univariate brain activity. A [1 -1] contrast
tested for differences between exploitation and exploration. All trials included in the analysis. The
goal of this analysis was to investigate whether much of the difference between exploitation and
exploration was explained by the task factors in GLM2.
GLM4 included the following regressors: Main effect (bias; column of ones), model entropy.
Dependent variable: multivariate representation strength. Analysis carried out as a multivariate
searchlight analysis. Only exploit trials (>5 trials from adjacent explore phase) included in the
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analysis. The goal of this analysis was to identify regions in which the representation strength varied
with model entropy.
GLM5 was the same as GLM4 except instead of the entropy regressor used the probability
(belief) assigned by the model that the currently exploited option is the high reward option. The
goal of this analysis was to show representation strength in the region identified in GLM4 varied
with the belief over the currently selected option (not just entropy, which captures the certainty of
the belief).
GLM6 included the following regressors: Main effect, change in baseline pupil diameter between
the current trial and the next, change in entropy. Dependent variable: change in multivariate repre-
sentation strength in mOFC (also performed as a whole brain searchlight analysis, as in Figure 3c).
Analysis performed separately on only exploit trials (>5 from adjacent explore phase), and only
explore trials. When this analysis was performed on explore trials, whether participants changed
their choice was added as a regressor to the GLM. These analyses were performed separately on tri-
als on which reward was delivered and omitted. The goal of this analysis was to test whether
changes in pupil diameter explained changes in representation strength.
GLM7 included the following regressors: Main effect, change in entropy. Dependent variable:
Univariate brain activity. Only exploit trials (>5 from adjacent explore phase) included in the analysis.
The goal of this analysis was to identify regions in which activity reflected changes in the model
entropy, and to test whether they were dissociated from those in which representation strength var-
ied with model entropy (as in GLM4).
GLM8 included the following regressors: Main effect, brain univariate activity, difference in
entropy following outcome between current trial and the previous, and whole-brain mean univariate
activity. Dependent variable: change in baseline pupil diameter between the current trial and the
next. Only exploit trials (>5 from adjacent explore phase) included in the analysis. (When this analysis
was performed on all trials, Figure 3—figure supplement 3, whether participants changed their
choice on the subsequent trial and whether the current trial was the last trial of exploitation were
added as regressors to the GLM.) The goal of this analysis was to identify brain regions in which uni-
variate activity explained changes in baseline pupil diameter.
Multiple comparisons correction was performed with cluster mass-based permutation testing with
the FSL function randomise. The clusters were thresholded voxelwise at p=0.001 and cluster masses
surviving correction at p<0.05 are presented.
fMRI multivariate measure of representation strength
To obtain a measure of representation strength at each grey matter voxel, we ran a multivariate
searchlight analysis over the whole-brain grey matter. We trained and tested the model on different
runs of the task. The configuration of available options differed across the runs, such that each
option appeared in two different runs. We therefore split the runs in to two pairs – each pair contain-
ing all eight options. We train the model on one pair and test on the other, and then repeat, training
and testing on the converse pairs.
The data used as input to the multivariate analyses are whole-brain, standard space beta maps
for each trial. We then focus our analyses on the cortex using a grey matter mask. At each grey mat-
ter voxel, a set of voxels for that searchlight centre is defined by including all voxels within a radius
of seven voxels from the searchlight centre and that lie within the grey matter mask. After perform-
ing dimensionality reduction on the voxels and ensuring a balanced training set (see following para-
graphs), we train a multinomial logistic regression model using the training set and then use this
model to obtain probabilities each of the eight locations was selected on each trial of the test set
(see below). This is then repeated switching the training and test sets. The result of this analysis is a
probability each of the eight options was selected on each trial of the task at each grey matter
voxel.
At each searchlight of the multivariate analysis, we performed dimensionality reduction and
ensured the number of exemplars of each option in the training set was balanced. We performed
dimensionality reduction to denoise the data (Mante et al., 2013) and to facilitate training the multi-
variate model (so that we didn’t have many more dimensions [voxels] than exemplars [trials]). We
concatenated the data across runs, and then at each searchlight centre extracted an nVoxels x
nTrials matrix. To perform the dimensionality reduction, we carried out principle components analy-
sis on the voxels-voxels covariance matrix. This resulted in nVoxels principle components (PCs) –
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each a vector of length nVoxels. We then kept only the top twenty PCs, which captured the 20 stron-
gest spatial modes of variation (shared variance across voxels). The eigenvalues associated with the
remainder of the PCs were all near 0, suggesting that the 20 PCs we retained captured most of the
spatial variance of activity. Having conducted the PCA, we obtained the contributions of each PC on
each trial by linear regression of the voxelwise patterns of activity on each trial against the PC vec-
tors. This resulted in a set of 20 PC contributions (the beta weights from the regression) for each trial
– a reduced-dimensionality (20 dimensions) representation of the activity on a given trial. These
were taken as the dimensions to be used as predictors in fitting the model. The 20 PC weights on
each trial were entered as predictor variables in to a multinomial logistic regression with the selected
option as the predicted variable to train the model.
We performed dimensionality reduction on the entire dataset (800 trials). Because this data set
included both training and test set, a reviewer raised the possibility that the procedure could intro-
duce bias into the pattern classification. Since the PCA is agnostic to trial labels it is not clear how
such bias could arise, but to check that the data reduction step did not give rise to spurious results
we conducted a permutation analysis in which 1000 sets of null data (obtained by shuffling voxel
identities within each trial) were passed through the entire analysis pipeline in the ROI defined on
the peak of the OFC effect. The resulting t scores for the regression of representation strength on
model entropy (the key result from this analysis) were symmetrically distributed about zero (Fig-
ure 2—figure supplement 2). The maximum value of t for these 1000 iterations was 3.09, compared
to the peak t-score of 6.8 obtained in mOFC. This suggests that our result is not due to bias intro-
duced by the data reduction procedure.
Because subjects had a free choice as to which option they selected, we had variable numbers of
trials on which a given participant selected each option (i.e. an imbalanced training set). To avoid
introducing bias in to the model to predict stimuli selected more often, we oversampled the training
set such that there were equal numbers of trials of each stimulus type used to train the model. We
did this by repeating the trials in the training set for each option until all classes had the same num-
ber of trials as the most selected option.
After training the model, we used it to provide probabilities of each option being selected on
each trial in the remaining data. For each trial in the test data, we used the PC beta weights on that
trial as input to the model to obtain the estimated probability that each option was the selected
option. This gave a probability on each trial for each of the eight options. To obtain a summary mea-
sure, we computed the ratio of the odds of classifying the trial as the chosen option, to the odds of
classifying it as one of the offered but unchosen options (i.e. those options that were available for
that run of the task but not selected on that trial). We took the logarithm of this ratio, providing us
with a measure of the selectivity to the selected action of each searchlight on each trial, namely the
log odds ratio, that is in theory normally distributed, although we used non-parametric statistics
(permutation testing) to assess the significance of results at the whole brain level. This trial-by-trial
scalar measure was then used in subsequent regression analyses to identify regions in which it is
explained by participants’ belief entropy or baseline pupil diameter.
Region of interest definitions
The ACC ROIs for the analyses to test whether ACC activity explained changes in representation
strength in mOFC were defined by thesholding the activation maps for both GLM7 and GLM8 at
p=0.001 and p=0.01 separately. Hence we tried the analysis with four different ROIs separately. For
ROIs we extracted the timecourses by applying the inverse of each participant’s registration to the
mask to project the mask from standard space in to subject space and extracted the mean time
series within this region of interest.
Pupil acquisition and analysis
We simultaneously measured pupil size while participants performed the task, in both the behaviou-
ral session and the fMRI session. We used an EyeLink eyetracker, SR Research to acquire pupil size
data, sampled at 1000 Hz.
We preprocessed the pupil size data using standard methods. We identified trials on which sub-
jects blinked and removed the blinks by interpolation of values measured just before and just after
the identified blinks. Trials on which the pupil measurement was lost were removed from the
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analyses. Finally, we removed the first 25 trials of each run of the task from analyses to avoid any
luminance changes that may be caused by starting a new run of the task. After removal of these dif-
ferent trials, the number of core exploitation trials went from 201 ± 7.6 to 162 ± 9.4 (mean ± SEM).
Pupil size in all analyses is normalised for each run by expressing it in terms of percentage differ-
ence from the overall mean pupil size on that run. Baseline pupil size is defined as mean (normalised)
pupil size in the 20 ms window preceding feedback.
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Appendix 1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.019
Modelling of beliefs and behaviour
This appendix follows directly from the Modelling of behaviour section in the Methods. It
includes additional modelling of participants’ behaviour using alternative models.
Relative Uncertainty
As an alternative measure of belief uncertainty, we calculated relative uncertainty (Nassar
et al., 2012). Relative uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty about (variance of) the outcome
given the most likely state of the world (defined as joint maximum likelihood estimate of
Ht; qtf g divided by uncertainty about the outcome given the full posterior over Ht; qtf g.
Over all participants and runs, Relative Uncertainty and Entropy were highly correlated
(mean value of Pearson’s r over all participants = 0.80, SEM = 0.0056). This reflects the fact
that both measures attempt to quantify the same construct (belief uncertainty). The evolution
of entropy, relative uncertainty and change point probability (see below) over a representative
run is shown in Appendix 1—figure 1 to give the reader a sense of the similarity between
these measures.
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Appendix 1—figure 1. Following the same layout as Figure 1 in the main text. Top panel – an
example schedule for one participant/run. Y axis values 1–4 are the possible high reward
locations, x axis values are trials. The dashed line shows the ground truth high reward location
over time. Open black circles are participants’ choices; red dots are reward omissions. Middle
panel - Entropy, relative uncertainty and change point probability measures, normalized for
comparison. Note that CPP peaks rapidly after reward omission but also falls off rapidly, whilst
entropy and relative uncertainty integrate multiple feedback events. Bottom panel – the
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probability distribution across candidate high reward locations (bright colors are higher
probabilities).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.020
Change Point Probability
Change point probability on trial t (CPPt) is defined as the posterior probability that a change
occurred between trial t-1 and trial t, after observing data point xt. From Bayes’ theorem, this
is the probability of observation xt given that a change point has occurred, multiplied by the
prior change point probability (i.e. inverse change point frequency), divided by the probability
of observation xt regardless of whether a change point has occurred.
CPPt ¼
p OtjHt 6¼Ht 1ð Þp Ht 6¼Ht 1ð Þ
p OtjHt 6¼Ht 1ð Þp Ht 6¼Ht 1ð Þþ p OtjHt ¼Ht 1ð Þp Ht ¼Ht 1ð Þ
In our model this translates as
CPPt ¼
3
4
p OtjLt 6¼Htð Þþ
1
4
p OtjLt ¼Htð Þ
  
 s
3
4
p OtjLt 6¼Htð Þþ
1
4
p OtjLt ¼Htð Þ
  
 sþ p Ot jLt;Ht 1ð Þ  1  sð Þ
As per our Bayesian model, p OtjLt 6¼ Htð Þ, the probability of the outcome given that there
has been a change point and the observer has chosen a low reward location, is given by a
binomial with a constant payout parameter (0.2). The probability of the outcome given that
there has been a change point and the observer has chosen the high reward location is given
by a binomial with the mean payout rate for high reward locations (0.8).
As per Nassar et al (Nassar et al., 2012), for the purposes of calculating CPP we define the
probability of the outcome given no change point, p OtjLt ¼ Htð Þ, as the probability of the
outcome Ot given that the true state of the world was the joint maximum likelihood values of
H and q on trial t-1, i.e. the most likely combination of the identity and payout rate of the high
reward option.
Over all participants and all runs, CPP moderately correlated with entropy (mean Pearson’s
r over all participants 0.37, SEM 0.0055) and weakly correlated with relative uncertainty (mean
Pearson’s r 0.20, SEM 0.0053). Conceptually, CPP differs from both entropy and relative
uncertainty in that CPP measures only the probability of a change point given the current
observation, whilst entropy and relative uncertainty integrate information across multiple trials.
This can be seen in the example plot of entropy, relative uncertainty and CPP, in which CPP
rises and falls on a single trial basis whilst entropy and relative uncertainty vary more smoothly
over trials (Appendix 1—figure 1).
Predicting participants’ choices
Although the purpose of our modelling was to provide trial-by-trial regressors to relate to
neural responses, rather than to optimally capture behaviour, we checked our model was a
reasonable fit to behaviour. To determine whether our model was a reasonable fit to the
behaviour of our participants, we defined an action policy by fitting a softmax function for
each participant and run, in which the model probabilities assigned to each option (of being
the high reward option) were used to predict option choice, with softmax temperature as a
free parameter. The model’s predicted choice (defined as the option with the highest
probability under the softmax) matched the participants’ actual choices on 94.2% of exploit
trials (averaged over all participants; SEM 0.70% across participants) and 31.5% (SEM 1.3%) of
explore trials.
Arguably it is more appropriate to fit two separate softmax functions with independent
temperature parameters for explore and exploit phases of the task, since behaviour may be
qualitatively different in the two cases (for example, behaviour could be more random in the
explore phase, which would be reflected in a higher softmax temperature). When we fit
softmax functions separately to explore and exploit trials, with temperature as an independent
free parameter for each trial category, 96.0% of exploit trials (SEM 0.57%) and 50.9% of
explore trials (SEM 1.8%) were predicted correctly. Notably the proportion of explore trials
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predicted correctly exceeded the expected proportion if people chose at random during
explore phases, which would be 25% (one sample t-test comparing the proportion correctly
classified to 25% across participants: t18 = 13.2, p=5.210
 11).
We compared the overall model log likelihood for the Bayesian model with a single
softmax policy, and two softmax policies (fitted separately to explore and exploit periods) to
two further models, which should represent a ceiling in terms of how well the model matches
the actual data, in that they are fit to participants’ responses rather than to latent variables
reflecting participants’ modelled beliefs. The first comparison model was a model in which the
probability of choosing the selected option was always one during exploit periods and always
0.25 during explore periods. We call this the ‘all or none’ model because its behaviour is
totally deterministic during exploit periods and totally random during explore periods. The
second comparison model was a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) described below in which
behaviour was classified as ‘explore’ or ‘exploit’ based on block length, and then the
probability of choosing the selected option was always one during exploit periods and always
0.25 during explore periods as for the all-or-none model. In each case the model log
likelihood was defined as the log likelihood of the model making the same choice as the
human observer, summed over all trials.
Over all participants, the HMM had the best model log likelihood (mean over all
participants =  165), closely followed by the Bayesian model with two separate softmax
policies ( 179). Both models did much better than the all-or-none model ( 308) and the
Bayesian model with a single softmax policy ( 473). Model log likelihoods for all models are
shown in Appendix 1—figure 2.
Appendix 1—figure 2. Model log likelihoods for each participant and each model, based on
predicting participants’ choices across all trials. Taken together, the model comparison suggests
that the Bayesian model, when allowed to adopt different softmax policies in explore and
exploit phases, performs very comparably to a model fitted directly to participants’ behaviour
(the HMM). Importantly, because the Bayesian model simulates latent states of belief
uncertainty (model entropy, relative uncertainty) even when behaviour is held constant during
exploitation periods, it provides useful information over and above that given by the HMM
(which does not model belief uncertainty at all). A second notable point is that the Bayesian
model (with double softmax policy) does predict participants’ behaviour during explore
periods. In contrast, the all-or-none model (which performed much worse than the Bayesian
model with double softmax policy) sets an upper bound on the model log likelihood that
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could be achieved if behaviour in the explore period was random (as the probability of the
chosen option during exploit periods is one and therefore model log likelihood is maximized
in these periods).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.021
Does belief uncertainty predict Explore-Exploit transitions?
An important feature of our model based approach was that we were able to model belief
uncertainty as entropy or relative uncertainty in the model’s hypothesis space. To confirm the
validity of this approach, we asked whether high entropy, relative uncertainty or change point
probability made participants more likely to transition from exploiting an option to
exploration.
Limiting our analysis to trials classified as ‘exploit’, we used logistic regression to ask
whether the probability of switching option on trial t + 1, given that a trial t was unrewarded,
depended on the relative uncertainty, entropy or change point probability on trial t (three
separate regression analyses). We limited the analysis to cases where trial t was unrewarded,
because participants switched chosen option only following unrewarded trials (mean
proportion of switch trial following an unrewarded trial = 97.4% across all participants and
runs). 21% of all trials over all participants were both classified as exploit and unrewarded and
hence used in this analysis.
Both higher entropy and higher relative uncertainty predicted a higher probability of
switching (entropy - t18 = 7.60, p=2.5710
 7; relative uncertainty - t18 = 13.50, p=3.710
 11).
Interestingly, high change point probability on a given trial t predicted a lower probability
of switching (change point probability - t18 = 6.45, p=2.2810
 6). The reason for this can be
seen in Appendix 1-figure 3 in which change point probability for the trials in the run up to an
exploit-explore transition is plotted. It is evident that CPP actually peaks 2–3 trials before the
transition (Appendix 1-figure 3). This lag is reflective of the fact that CPP is driven primarily by
reward omission on the current trial t, whilst participants’ behaviour is guided by integrating
outcomes over multiple trials, and thus participants were unlikely to switch on an unrewarded
trial, unless other recent trials were also unrewarded. The proportion of exploit-explore
transitions for which trial t-1, t-2 and t-3 were unrewarded was (mean ±SEM across
participants): 13.1% (±2.36%), 57.5% (±6.4%) and 73.9% (±2,6%) respectively.
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Appendix 1—figure 3. Change point probability in the trials leading up to, and following, the
transition from exploit- to explore phase. The last exploit trial is coded as  1, the first explore
trial as +1 (there is no trial zero in this plot). CPP peaks on the penultimate trial of the exploit
block, or the trial before that.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.022
Both entropy and relative uncertainty are measures of the belief uncertainty that arises from
reward omission integrated over multiple trials. To obtain a model-agnostic view of factors
predicting exploit-explore transitions, we performed a logistic regression (limited to
unrewarded trials in exploit periods) using reward omission on the previous four trials (t-1 to
t-4) as explanatory variables. Reward omission on trials t-1 and t-2 significantly predicted
option switching (i.e. exploit-explore transitions); on trial t-3 the effect was just n.s. and on trial
t-4 the effect was clearly n.s. (p values for trials t-1 to t-4 respectively: 3.81  10 6, 7.63 
10 5, 0.064, 0.65 – non-parametric sign test used as the regression coefficients were grossly
non-normal across the group). These results further confirm that participants integrated
reward omission over 3–4 trials (including the final exploit trial, t) to drive exploit-explore
transitions.
Classification of behaviour into Explore and Exploit phases
Throughout the main manuscript we used a heuristic method to define exploitation periods.
We defined the start of a period of exploitation as the first trial on which participants selected
the true high reward probability option and received reward, and the end of the exploit
period as the last trial before switching to a different option (thus within exploit periods, by
definition, all choices were for the same option). We furthermore defined ‘core exploit’ trials
as trials within an exploit block, more than five trials from the preceding and following
changes of action. The primary aim of this heuristic was to identify, in a conservative way, trials
that we could be confident represented stable exploitation behaviour. This was important
because we wanted to carry out a number of analyses only on ‘core exploit’ trials – trials
where overt behaviour was stable but belief certainty varied.
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It is possible to take a more principled, model-based approach to the definition of explore
and exploit phases of the task and we present such an analysis here to justify the use of our
heuristic.
Ebitz and colleagues (Ebitz et al., 2018) gave careful consideration to how trials may be
classified as explore or exploit in a task similar but not identical to the present task (three arm
bandit with independently drifting bandit values; the present task is a four arm bandit but the
bandit values are tied to each other). They concluded that a Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
may be used to classify trials into explore- and exploit- states, based on block length. They
fitted a double exponential distribution to block lengths, with the logic that block lengths are
shorter in explore periods and longer in exploit periods. They then fitted a hidden Markov
model to participants’ choices, in which the hidden states were exploit (one state per option)
or explore.
We used the same approach to classify trials as explore or exploit in the present task. The
hidden states were {exploit option 1, exploit option 2, exploit option 3, exploit option 4,
explore}. In each exploit state the only possible observation was the selection of the exploited
option. In the explore state all options were equally likely to be selected. Transitions were
possible (end equally likely) from the explore state to any exploit state. Transitions were also
possible from each exploit state to the explore state, but not directly to another exploit state.
The probabilities of transitioning between states were determined by the fitted time constants
of the block length distributions for explore- and exploit- states; where b1 was the time-
constant of the fitted exponential distribution of block lengths in the explore condition,
p1 ¼
1
b1
was the probability of transitioning from exploration to an (any) explore state; as all
exploit states were equally likely, the probability of transition to any given exploit state
was 1
4b1
. Similarly where b2 was the time-constant of the fitted exponential distribution of block
lengths in the exploit condition, p2 ¼
1
b2
was the probability of transitioning from an
exploitation state to the explore state. Transitions directly between exploit states had
probability zero.
The classification of trials as ‘exploit’ and ‘core exploit’ by our heuristic and the Ebitz
approach can be compared in Appendix 1—figure 4. The critical trial group used for the
analysis of stable exploit periods, called ‘core exploit’, was defined as exploit trials more than
five trials from the nearest explore trial. In this trial group the two models were concordant in
that almost all trials classified as ‘core exploit’ by our heuristic were also classified as ‘core
exploit’ by the HMM approach (mean ±SEM across participants: 97.3% ± 0.37%).
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Appendix 1—figure 4. Explore and Exploit phases extracted by the Ebitz model. Trials
classified as ‘exploit’ (light grey) and ‘core exploit’ (dark grey) using our heuristic method (top)
and the HMM method (bottom) for each of the 19 participants included in the main analysis.
The HMM method tends to classify more trials as ‘exploit’ but because these are often short
blocks, the trials classified as ‘core exploit’, used in all the multivariate analyses in the paper,
are very similar for both classification methods.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39404.023
Conversely, the HMM approach classified some additional trials as core exploit, which were
not so-classified by our heuristic (mean ±SEM across participants: 7.8% ± 1.3%). By definition,
these excess exploit trials arise when participants erroneously select a low reward option for a
long period of time, even though it had never (within that exploit phase) been the high reward
option. For this reason, these additional exploit trials could be interpreted as periods of off-
task behaviour. During the additional exploit trials, model entropy is likely high (as by
definition participants are selecting a low-reward option and thus experiencing many reward
omissions), but representational strength in any internal model would likely be low (due to
disengagement from the task). We thus felt that the inclusion of these additional trials could
artificially inflate the relation between model entropy and representation strength and chose
to use our more conservative although heuristic approach throughout.
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